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ABSTRACT 
This thesis utilizes principles of the systems engineering process discussed by 
Dennis Buede in “The Engineering Design of Systems: Models and Methods (2nd 
ed.)” (2009). The systems engineering process is used to create a functional 
architecture to analyze interagency coordination in support of counterterrorism 
efforts in the United States European Command area of operation. The resulting 
functional architecture serve as tools for policymakers as they determine the best 
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The events that transpired on September 11, 2001 serve as a harsh reality 
check for the United States (U.S.).  “The 9/11 Commission Report” found that 
one of the inadequacies that led to the attack was the lack of intelligence sharing 
between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) (2004). In 2010, United States Armed Forces European 
Command (EUCOM) stood up the Joint Interagency Counter-Trafficking Center 
(JICTC). The mission of this organization is coordinating interagency efforts to 
counter illicit trafficking and terrorism in the EUCOM area of responsibility (AOR). 
Joint military operations have encountered countless interoperability issues 
throughout the years. The idea of joint operations to leverage all aspects of the 
military was never a novel one, but it called for thorough examination of the many 
systems that comprise the military. Much like joint operations is an iterative 
process to achieve commendable results, the interagency effort requires analysis 
to determine how the systems shall coordinate and cooperate to achieve a 
synchronous whole of government approach to accomplish the mission of 
counterterrorism.  
This thesis utilizes the systems engineering principles outlined by Dennis 
Buede in “The Engineering Design of Systems: Models and Methods (2nd ed.)” 
(2009). Specifically, the systems engineering design process utilized for this 
thesis was: 
1. To develop the operational concept 
2. Define the system boundary with an external systems diagram 
3. Develop the system objectives hierarchy; develop, analyze, and 
refine requirements (stakeholders’ and system) 
4. Ensure requirements feasibility 
5.  Develop a functional architecture that traces back to the objectives 
and requirements of the stakeholders 
 xvi 
A functional architecture defines what a system must do. This is 
accomplished by setting a single top-level function and decomposing that into its 
component sub-functions. The functional decomposition identifies all of the 
functionality that must take place for a system to perform its task. The top-level 
function for this system it to conduct interagency coordination to support the 
counterterrorism effort in the EUCOM AOR. The sub-functions were determined 
to be: 
F1.1 – Identify Mission 
F1.2 – Share Information 
F1.3 – Identify Capability Gaps and Overlaps 
F1.4 – Train Partners to Conduct Interagency Coordination 
F1.5 – Select Strong Leadership 
F1.6 – Assess Progress 
Each of these functions contributes to the overall functionality of the top-
level function. Further decomposing each of these sub-functions and then tracing 
those to associated requirements verified these functions.  
The creation of a physical architecture is the next step in the design 
process. This step was not completed in this thesis. The result of this study was 
to recommend a sub-committee structure within EUCOM. Each sub-committee 
would be comprised of EUCOM military and civilian staff as well interagency 
representatives that are also billeted to certain directorates within EUCOM. The 
sub-committee organization forces directorates to come together to enhance 
their abilities to accomplish EUCOM missions. Each sub-committee is 
accountable for their assigned sub-function. The additive nature of these sub-
committees results in the “Interagency Committee” at EUCOM.  
 xvii 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
The Joint Interagency Counter Trafficking Center (JICTC) supports 
US Interagency and Country Team efforts, and collaborates with 
similar international organizations, to effectively and efficiently 
counter transnational illicit trafficking and terrorism in United States 
Armed Forces European Command (EUCOM) Area of Interest, and 
assists European and Eurasian nations to build self-sufficient 
counter trafficking and counterterrorism skills, competencies, and 
capacity in support of defending the Homeland forward. 
Admiral James G. Stavridis (EUCOM, 2011) 
The war on terror is a global fight. Terrorists operate in dynamic ways, in 
various countries and regions, for various purposes, from low to high capabilities, 
under many different organizational structures, traditional and non-traditional 
recruitment, possessing varying levels of funding. This means that the United 
States must effectively leverage its assets to combat these threats. Interagency 
coordination is paramount now and in the future. The objective of interagency 
coordination is to utilize the strengths and skills of the entire U.S. government, 
and its allies, to pursue and complete shared missions. Governmental agencies 
must utilize their individual skills to prevent another 9/11-type attack on the U.S. 
or its allies.   
B. OBJECTIVE 
 This research utilizes a systems engineering process to produce a 
functional architecture that can be used to design, develop, and/or improve upon 
a system for interagency coordination with respect to counter trafficking and 
terrorism efforts. This study also identifies past and current successes and 
shortcomings. These lessons learned provide the basis for evaluation of a 
working system.  
The results of these architectures will be a functional system design, 
based on a hierarchy of functions derived from system requirements, which 
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ultimately trace up to Combatant Command (COCOM) strategy and National 
Security Strategy. This research also aims to assist the COCOM staffing decision 
maker to arrive at educated conclusions as to which interagency representatives 
are performing which functions and which required functions are not being 
performed, if any.  
C. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
 
Figure 1.   The Interagency “Network” (After JHU-APL, 2009) 
Transnational trafficking is a multi-faceted security concern, which 
undermines U.S. strategic interest. It contributes to weakening of the rule of law 
and fosters other forms of illicit activities such as terrorism, insurgency, drug 




smuggling. This multi-faceted problem requires that the nation’s resources work 
together to achieve a common goal of disrupting these networks and movements 
(White House, 2011). 
Figure 1 illustrates the “Interagency Network,” providing a glimpse of the 
array of agencies that interconnect as part of their missions in support of the U.S. 
government.  It is clear, as seen in the figure, that the Department of Defense 
(DoD) must coordinate its global activities with agencies such as the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department 
of Commerce, Department of Energy (DOE), and the Department of State, 
among many others. Additionally, the 2010 QDR requires that the military 
strengthen and expand its interagency partnerships. Therefore, U.S. Armed 
Forces European Command (EUCOM) has responded to this guidance by 
standing up the JICTC and EUCOM Interagency Partnering Directorate (ECJ9). 
The mission of the U.S. European Command is to conduct military 
operations, international military engagement, and interagency 
partnering to enhance transatlantic security and defend the United 
States forward. (EUCOM, 2012) 
The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab (JHU-APL, 2009) 
published a handbook titled Interagency Teaming to Counter Irregular Threats. 
The handbook claims that there is a fundamental cultural difference between the 
DoD and other governmental agencies such as the Department of State (DoS) 
and National Security Council (NSC). Among the claims is that personnel with 
military background tend to “step on toes, violate lanes, and usurp authority to try 
to get the job done on their timeline and in their style (JHU-APL, 2009).”   
The problem examined in this thesis is how to improve the conduct of 
interagency operations to counter trafficking and terrorism in the EUCOM AOR. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What are the objectives, requirements, and functions necessary for 
productive interagency coordination allowing for the successful 
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conduct of counter trafficking and counterterrorism in the EUCOM 
area of responsibility (AOR)? 
2. How can a stakeholder analysis, objectives hierarchy, requirements 
definition, and functional decomposition assist EUCOM in its effort 
to disrupt transnational terrorist networks? 
E. SCOPE  
 Interagency operations apply to a wide range of military operations across 
the United States and around the world. The focus of this research is on the 
counter trafficking and terrorism efforts taking place in the EUCOM AOR. Figure 
2 is a map showing locations of all COCOMs, and therefore illustrates the 
breadth of the EUCOM AOR and the large number of diverse nations that it 
contains.  
This thesis provides a functional architecture of how EUCOM, and 
subsequently other COCOM’s, addresses the key counter-trafficking 
requirements and how they are interrelated. The COCOM level of decision-
making allows for a review of top-level, broad analysis of required functions. This 
thesis provides the preliminary investigation of how basic systems engineering 
can assist in the design of an organization intended to disrupt trafficking and 
terrorism. The results of this thesis should then be expanded upon to include 
modeling and simulation to verify it for implementation.  
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Figure 2.   COCOM AORs (From DoD, 2011) 
F. METHODOLOGY 
This research leans heavily on the systems engineering process 
described by Dennis Buede’s The Engineering Design of Systems: Models and 
Method. The results from this application of the systems engineering process 
include a list of requirements with a corresponding functional analysis. The 
systems engineering process is further explained in Chapter III.  
G.  THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II discusses the interagency operations that are in place and 
operating in EUCOM. It will include a literature review of the interagency concept. 
Chapter III explains the systems engineering process that is used to analyze this 
interagency coordination system to counter terrorism at EUCOM. Chapter IV 
describes the functional analysis. Chapter V presents a preliminary generalized 
physical analysis. Chapter VI offers a summary of the results, conclusion, and 
recommendations for further research. 
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II. INTERAGENCY COORDINATION TO COUNTER 
TERRORISM IN THE EUCOM AOR 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. National Security Strategy (NSS) 
Time and again in our Nation’s history, Americans have risen to 
meet -and to shape - moments of transition. This must be one of 
those moments. We live in a time of sweeping change. The 
success of free nations, open markets, and social progress in 
recent decades has accelerated globalization on an unprecedented 
scale. This has opened the doors of opportunity around the globe, 
extended democracy to hundreds of millions of people, and made 
peace possible among the major powers. Yet globalization has also 
intensified the dangers we face – from international terrorism and 
the spread of deadly technologies, to economic upheaval and a 
changing climate.  
President Barack Obama (White House, 2010) 
The NSS recognizes that the interconnectedness of the world is both a 
blessing and a curse. The increased lines of communication allow the world to 
communicate and exchange information more readily, but it also creates more 
points of vulnerability. The NSS calls for a strengthening of national capacity by 
utilizing a whole of government approach. It recognizes that there have been 
significant steps made in the effort to synthesize the skillset and capabilities 
within military and civilian organizations. One example of this call for increased 
interagency coordination has been the merging of National Security Council 
(NSC) and Homeland Security Council staffs. The NSS does point out areas that 
require improvement to enhance this whole of government approach (White 
House, 2010). These include: 
1. More effectively ensuring alignment of resources with our national 
security strategy 
2. Adapting the education and training of national security professionals 
 8 
3. Reviewing authorities and mechanisms to implement and coordinate 
assistance programs and other policies and programs that strengthen 
coordination 
The NSS vigorously defends its policy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al-
Qa’ida and its violent extremist affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the 
world. Key requirements in this fight include building positive partnerships with 
Muslim communities around the world and utilizing a broad, sustained, and 
integrated campaign that applies every tool of American power (White House, 
2010). The message is clear. The U.S. must grow its partnerships, both home 
and abroad, to be able to meet the dynamic challenges that the future presents 
with regard to national security.  
2. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (TOC)  
Despite a long and successful history of dismantling criminal 
organizations and developing common international standards for 
cooperation against transnational organized crime, not all of our 
capabilities have kept pace with the expansion of 21st century 
transnational criminal threats. Therefore, this strategy is organized 
around a single, unifying principle: to build, balance, and integrate 
the tools of American power to combat transnational organized 
crime and related threats to our national security – and to urge our 
partners to do the same. 
President Barack Obama (White House, 2011) 
 The Strategy to Combat TOC lays out five policy objectives (White House, 
2011): 
1. Protect Americans and our partners from the harm, violence, and 
exploitation of transnational criminal networks. 
2. Help partner countries strengthen governance and transparency, break 
the corruptive power of transnational criminal networks, and sever state-
crime alliances. 
3. Break the economic power of transnational criminal networks and 
protect strategic markets and the U.S. financial system for TOC 
penetration and abuse. 
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4. Defeat transnational criminal networks that pose the greatest threat to 
national security, by targeting their infrastructures, depriving, them of their 
enabling means, and preventing the criminal facilitation of terrorist 
activities. 
5. Build international consensus, multilateral cooperation, and public-
private partnerships to defeat TOC. 
3. Quadrennial Defense Review 
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) re-affirms the Department 
of Defense’s (DoD) aspiration to develop and strengthen its relationships both 
foreign and domestic to maximize the effectiveness of preventing and responding 
to crises around the world. For example, in the continual fight against irregular 
warfare, the United States (U.S) military has had the opportunity to experience 
how important the partnership amongst U.S. departments and agencies can be. 
The 2010 QDR calls for a strengthening of interagency partnerships so that the 
U.S. military capabilities parallel other agencies’ abilities such as diplomacy, 
development, law enforcement, trade, intelligence, and border protection to 
support a whole-of-government approach to national defense and security.  
The DoD’s definition for interagency coordination is “Within the context of 
Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between 
elements of the Department of Defense and engaged U.S. government agencies 
for the purpose of achieving an objective (Joint Publication 3-08, 2006).” The 
DoD plans to better clarify interagency roles and responsibilities as well as 
identifying capability gaps that must be filled (QDR, 70). The united effort will 
help to build capacity and efficiency by identifying duplicitous work, assigning the 
correct civilian or military leadership to various circumstances, and opening the 
lines of communication between agencies. 
U.S. defense capabilities are the greatest and most expansive that the 
world has ever seen, but its reach and resources are still finite. The call for 
increased synthesis between military and governmental agencies is necessary 
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for the continued fight against decentralized, networked extremist groups. The 
U.S. should prioritize its efforts against the threats deemed most dangerous and 
likely to do harm while maintaining an eye on the unexpected occurrences (INSS 
Proceedings, 6). The QDR also states that, “Sustaining existing alliances and 
creating new partnerships are central elements of U.S. security strategy. The 
United States cannot sustain a stable international system alone.” The U.S. must 
rely on its partnerships for like-minded action.  
4.  Interagency Teaming to Counter Irregular Threats 
The JHU/APL handbook on interagency teaming provides a background 
on the nature of the interagency environment. It provides insights and best 
practices that can be utilized to further the interagency team at the operational 
level. The need for interagency teaming is evident from the wide variety of 
threats faced in today’s security environment. The irregular threats include 
trafficking of persons, weapons of mass destruction, narcotics, threat finance, 
homeland security and defense, unconventional warfare, terrorism, cyber 
warfare, insurgency, and piracy (JHU/APL, 2009). All of these aspects are 
relevant to the EUCOM AOR. The JICTC transnational threat focus areas are 
narcotics trafficking, terrorism, weapons trafficking, and persons trafficking 
(EUCOM, 2011). 
JHU/APL hosted an Interagency Workshop in May 2009 and identified the 
following six key functions for successful interagency teaming: 
1. Share information across agencies and actors 
2. Leverage resources, skill sets, and expertise 
3. Coordinate and collaborate 
4. Distill issues for elevation to senior leaders 
5. Facilitate action 
6. Operationalize policy 
 11 
The handbook goes on to name these current challenges the interagency 
teaming process: 
1. Lack of national integration mechanism  
2. Lack of established processes 
3. Organizational mismatch 
4. Legal constraints 
5. Capacity and resource constraints 
6. Intramural turf battles 
7. Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus 
8. Lack of understanding 
9. Wicked problems 
10. Communications constraints 
Additionally, the handbook specifies the top ten best practices that it 
observed. 
1. Get the right people on the team 
2. Establish good external communications 
3. Practice cross-cultural communications 
4. Keep good records 
5. Understand and leverage partner capabilities and expertise 
6. Provide adequate resources 
7. Manage resources effectively 
8. Break down barriers to information sharing 
9. Tailor leadership style to the networked team 
10. Establish personal working relationships 
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Lastly, the handbook presents case studies of various interagency teams. 
The counterterrorism case study presented was that of the Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). TSCTP is a U.S. government program 
aimed at defeating terrorist organizations by: strengthening regional 
counterterrorism capabilities, enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among 
the region’s security forces, promoting democratic governance, discrediting 
terrorist ideology, and reinforcing bilateral military ties with the U.S. (Africa 
Command, 2012). Table 1 illustrates the wide-ranging efforts required in this 
Trans-Saharan effort to counterterrorism. This effort required U.S. government 
agencies to coordinate with military, civilians, non-government organizations, and 
especially with the host nations. 
 
Table 1.   Interagency Effort in TSCTP (From JHU/APL, 2009) 
The JHU/APL interagency teaming handbook points out these lessons 
learned. 
1. The program is hampered by the absence of a strategic plan that lays 
out a common vision, end state, and operational guidance in terms understood 
by all of the interagency partners. 
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2. There is no comprehensive, integrated strategy to implement the 
program. There are no clear goals, objectives, or milestones to reach objectives. 
Agency plans do not always other agencies’ missions.  
3. There is a lack of prioritization and de-confliction. Funding streams 
make it difficult to integrate programs and activities.  
4. There is no program in place to evaluate performance. 
5. Roles and responsibilities are unclear. 
These key functions, best practices, and lessons learned will serve as 
valuable reference for the functional analysis in Chapter IV. 
5. DoD Training for Operations with Interagency, Multinational, 
and Coalition Partners 
The RAND Corporation released a study for the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD). The objective of this study was to provide defense planners with 
recommendations on how to better prepare U.S. military personnel to work 
successfully with a host of partners. These partners include governmental 
agencies, multinational organization, and coalition partner countries (Spirtas, 
Moroney,Thie, Hogler, Young, 2008).  
The first part of this RAND Corporation study was dedicated to generating 
an Integrated-Operation task list. This is derived from a list from the Universal 
Joint Task List (UJTL), Army Universal Task List (AUTL), also in use by the Air 
Force, Marine Corps Task List (MCTL), and the Navy Tactical Task List (NTTL) 
that altogether contained 255 tasks that the U.S. military need be able to perform 
during integrated operations. This combined task list is referred to as the 
Mission-Essential Task List (METL). This Integrated-Operation task list is 
separated into these five categories to make the list manageable: 
1. Establish relations with partners 
2. Provide security operation 
3. Conduct operations with and for partners 
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4. Collect and disseminate information 
5. Support inter-partner communications 
Each of the 255 tasks identified in the METL fall somewhere in the realm 
of these five categories. The similarities in categories and tasks delineated in this 
study and the one conducted by JHU/APL are fundamentally similar if not the 
same. These five categories served as a resource for the functional analysis and 
stakeholder analysis presented in later chapters. 
5. Global Strategic Assessment 2009: America’s Security Role in 
a Changing World 
The Institution for National Strategic Studies (INSS) published this in 2009 
and it assessed the state of security in the world, discussed various trends 
observed in different areas of the world, and provided discussion and subsequent 
forecasts to serve as a platform to begin reform of the Nation’s security policies 
to match what was to come. This study utilized 125 SMEs from the INSS and 
National Defense University (NDU). One of the conclusions reached by this 
assessment echoes that of the previous studies mentioned. They determined 
that the U.S. remains the only country capable and willing to take the lead role in 
addressing the world’s security, but its resources are finite. The study calls for 
the government to re-assess, re-prioritize, and reform its security policy to reflect 
the current and future threats. Most important to this thesis, the study 
emphasized the role that interagency operations and whole of government 
approaches must play to guarantee the security of the world in the future.   
The study used a systems engineering approach to the interagency 
problem. It points out that few studies on the inadequacies of interagency 
operations ever get to the root cause of the problem. “The lack of attention to 
problem analysis can produce recommendations based on conventional wisdom 
rather than the careful examination of the facts (INSS, 2009).” Table 2 was 
extracted from the INSS study and presents various inadequate interagency 
coordination attempts. The excerpt from the 9/11 Commission Report indicated 
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“…Responsibility and accountability were diffuse.”  The reform study concluded 
that interagency coordination required a unifying leader or manager. This leader 
must act to focus the efforts of the whole.   
 
Table 2.   The Need to Reform Interagency Coordination (From INSS, 2009) 
B. EUCOM INTERAGENCY PARTNERING DIRECTORATE (ECJ9) 
“The J9 is a ‘whole of society’ organization seeking partnerships to 
support enduring peace and stability in Europe and Eurasia.” (EUCOM J9, 2012) 
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ECJ9’s focus is to forge new and enhance existing relationships with like-minded 
organizations to improve regional security and stability. The U.S. government 
agencies that have representatives on staff are: 
1. Department of State (DOS) 
2. Department of Treasury (Treasury) 
3. Department of Energy (DOE) 
4. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
5. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
6. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
7. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
8. Department of Justice (DOJ) 
9. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
 
Figure 3.   ECJ9 Coincidence of Purpose (From EUCOM, 2012) 
These interagency partners are integral members of the EUCOM team. 
Figure 3 displays that the goal of ECJ9 is to help EUCOM realize that there are 
shared interests that the DoD and U.S. governmental agencies can work 
together to achieve. They work with U.S. military planners and staff to ensure 
close coordination in EUCOM theater activities (EUCOM, 2012). 
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C. JOINT INTERAGENCY COUNTER TRAFFICKING CENTER (JICTC) 
 
Figure 4.   JICTC Development Background (From EUCOM, 2011) 
The JICTC missions statement is to “Support the synchronization of 
Interagency efforts to counter illicit trafficking and terrorism and assist focus 
nations in building self-sufficient counter-trafficking and counterterrorism skills, 
competencies, and capacity.” (EUCOM, 2011) Figure 4 shows that JICTC is still 
in its infancy as an organization. Admiral Stavridis, commander of EUCOM and 
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, witnessed firsthand the successes that are 
possible while utilizing interagency coordination to accomplish a mission. His 
previous command was at Joint Interagency Task Force- South (JIATF-S) at U.S. 
South Command (SOUTHCOM).  
JIATF-S serves as the interagency organization to serve as a blueprint for 
current and future efforts. The JHU/APL interagency teaming handbook contains 
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a case study on JIATF-S. The mission of JIATF-S is to conduct counter-illicit 
trafficking operations. JIATF-S is structured so that interagency partners conduct 
themselves according to the authority that they inherently possess. Each 
partnering agency provides support at a level that they are comfortable with 
(JHU/APL, 2009). Each partner agencies’ strengths are utilized to meet mission 
goals. Success is then translated into metrics that each agency can grasp.   
 
Figure 5.   A Theoretical Perspective of the Threat and Potential Impact of the 
JICTC (After EUCOM, 2011) 
JIATF-S is directly accountable to the Executive Office of the President, and not 
to the DoD. This ensures that roles and responsibilities are clear. Interagency 
agreements are designed to meet the mission of the task force as a whole and 
not an individual agency. In addition, the funding for the task force is separate 
from the funding stream of each partner agency. Lastly, the process for 
information sharing is high on turnaround time and efficiency.  
Figure 5 illustrates the theoretical relationships that govern the need for 




level of instability in a government increases. The same increase in necessity for 
interagency cooperation is present as the escalation impact of transnational 
threats increases.  
The role that JICTC will play at EUCOM will not be completely analogous 
to the role that JIATF-S plays at SOUTHCOM. For example, JIATF-S functions 
include detection, monitoring, and interdiction. However, JICTC can draw from 
some of the best practices being conducted at JIATF-S and implement those that 
are corollary at EUCOM. JIATF-S has proven that unity of mission and command 
promotes teamwork. Shared rewards, equality in decision-making, and a firmly 
established training protocol are all positive characteristics that JICTC can look to 
JIATF-S to pattern itself after. Figure 6 depicts the current organizational 
structure established at EUCOM. The typical hierarchical structure does allow for 
the easiest flow of information (JHU/APL, 2009). 
 
Figure 6.   E
UCOM Command Structure (After EUCOM, 2011) 
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III.  SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS  
A. DENNIS M. BUEDE: THE ENGINEERING DESIGN OF SYSTEMS 
1. Background 
A system is commonly defined to be a collection of hardware, 
software, people, facilities, and procedures organized to 
accomplish some common objectives.  
Dennis M. Buede (2009) 
The systems engineering study is concerned with the entire life cycle of 
the system. A correctly engineered system pays full attention to the requirements 
of stakeholders from the time that the system is conceived until the time that the 
system is no longer needed and is disposed of. The systems engineering 
process involves a decomposition of a system’s functions followed by a re-
composition process. During the decomposition process the systems engineer 
must learn what the stakeholder’s requirements are of the system. The 
Engineering Design of Systems identifies a process for system design, and the 
first several steps of the process are identified below and addressed in this thesis 
(2009, 51): 
0a Define the problem to be solved 
0b Define and evaluate alternate concepts for solving the problem 
1. Define the system level design problem being solved 
2. Develop the system functional architecture 
B. DEFINE THE SYSTEM LEVEL DESIGN PROBLEM BEING SOLVED: 
STAKEHOLDER’S REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT 
Buede outlines the following seven functions to develop stakeholder 
requirements: 
1. Develop operational concept 
2. Define the system boundary with external systems diagram 
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3. Develop system objectives hierarchy 
4. Develop, analyze, and refine requirements (stakeholders’ and system) 
5. Ensure requirements feasibility 
6. Define the qualification system requirements 
7. Obtain approval of system documentation 
 To remain within the scope of this thesis, only the first four sections of 
defining the design problem are explored. The remaining sections are open for 
further research.  
1. Develop Operational Concept 
Buede defines operational concept as “a vision for what the system is (in 
general terms), a statement of mission requirements, and a description of how 
the system will be used. The shared vision is based on the perspective of the 
system’s stakeholders of how the system will be developed, produced, deployed, 
trained, operated and maintained, refined, and retired to overcome some 
operational problem and achieve the stakeholders’ operational needs and 
objectives. The mission requirements are stated in terms of measures of 
effectiveness.” (2009, 481) 
The JICTC supports U.S. Interagency and Country Team efforts, 
and collaborates with similar international organizations, to 
effectively and efficiently counter transnational illicit trafficking and 
terrorism in USEUCOM’s Area of Interest, and assist European and 
Eurasian nations to build self-sufficient counter trafficking and 
counterterrorism skills, competencies, and capacity in support of 
defending the Homeland forward. (EUCOM, 2011) 
EUCOM requires a system that will facilitate efficient and effective 
interagency operations to support the missions of counter trafficking and 
terrorism. This system will aid the combatant command achieve these missions 
by promoting interagency coordination, collaboration, and agreement. This whole 
of government approach traces back to the National Security Strategy 
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promulgated by the President. The intention of the system is to utilize the 
capabilities of each agency to contribute to overall mission completion. 
a. Daily Operations Scenario 
Interagency representatives’ daily role is to seek out ways to utilize 
their expertise and training to disrupt transnational threats. A typical day would 
have these representatives attending briefs that indicate current threats and 
concerns. Each representative shall comment, as necessary, during these 
briefings. Information passed during these briefings are inputs for each 
representative. These representatives, and DoD members, are then expected to 
use these inputs to collaborate with one another to develop plans of action to 
counter those threats and concerns. 
These plans can be large or small-scale according to the type of 
threat, timeliness of action required, country in which the dilemma is present, 
amongst other factors. It is up to the interagency partnership to make 
recommendations and present the appropriate EUCOM directorates with options 
to proceed.  
Cooperation does not always require the whole of system 
approach. It is also important that these individuals maintain their own workspace 
and time that will allow them to focus on implementing their skillset to the 
problem. An open door policy allows partners to call on their peers to assist in 
problem solving. This open door policy is supported by ensuring close physical 
locations for partner’s workspaces. The lines of communication between 
interagency representatives, country team representatives, and the EUCOM 
directorates are open. For example, the EUCOM Intelligence directorate receives 
information indicating a newly discovered terrorist cell in Country Red is actively 
recruiting in a region of Country Orange. The CIA, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), and other intelligence personnel shall corroborate this 
information. The country teams for Country Red and Orange are contacted to 
discuss the current situation and to formalize a plan of action to limit the terrorist 
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recruiting.   The COCOM Commander is made aware of this matter and chooses 
to initiate a police training program in Country Orange to assist in limiting the 
recruiting activities. The optimal day-to-day system operation will result in each 
partner conducting push and pull information sharing that will lead to action being 
taken by appropriate figures to disrupt terrorist networks. 
b.  Emergency Response Scenario 
The interagency cooperation system demonstrates its full capability 
during emergencies. During an emergency, decisions must be made quickly and 
decisively. The success of emergency response depends on the level of 
preparedness. Preparedness requires planning and training. Interagency 
coordination during the planning process ensures that the gamut of the 
emergency response is covered. 
First, the interagency network holds a conference that solidifies 
plans for major natural and mad-made disasters. These plans include prevention, 
preparedness, response, recovery, and training. Input from each partner may not 
be required, but the opportunity to add to these emergency plans is. The U.S. 
has a stake in assisting nations cope with natural disasters. It helps build the 
image of the U.S. as a country that values life. 
Second, once an emergency occurs, a notice is issued that calls all 
required personnel to report to the EUCOM command and control center. This 
room is akin to NASA mission control in Houston, TX. The room is a semi-circle 
of theater style rows, lined with workstations. At floor-level are multiple large 
monitors displaying up to date information. This command center allows all of the 
EUCOM staff to come together so that all levels of government within the 
EUCOM organization can come together to coordinate the execution of 
emergency response. For example, a large nuclear power plant in Country 
Orange has suffered a partial meltdown. The nearby town is inundated by the 
catastrophe. The president of Country Orange requests assistance in responding 
to the disaster. EUCOM responds by dispatching armed forces personnel to 
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assist in evacuation efforts. The evacuation is headed by the Country Orange 
military, but assistance is rendered from a Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA). EUCOM coordinates the transport of Department of Energy 
(DOE), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency (DTRA) personnel from the U.S. to Country Orange to assist 
in meltdown procedures and cleanup efforts. The USAID representative at 
EUCOM cooperates with their country team counterpart to organize medical 
care, shelter, food, and water for displaced individuals.  
2.  Define the System Boundary with External Systems Diagram 
Each directorate within EUCOM will utilize this system. The scope of this 
thesis limits the system to use within the EUCOM staff, but it could be applied to 
the larger interagency problem. The system boundaries must be defined to 
eliminate any doubt as to where the system starts and stops (Buede, 2009). 
Figure 7 describes the boundaries and the interactions within and across those 
boundaries. This interagency coordination system enhances information-
sharing, establishment of common goals, understanding of partners’ capabilities, 
and overall mission accomplishment within the bounds of the EUCOM staff. 
Inputs to the system will be requirements set forth by those entities superior to 
EUCOM and events (data sets, intelligence collection, news sources, etc.) that 
are external to the system. The non-EUCOM entity that is included in the system 
is the U.S. country teams. These teams will partner directly with EUCOM staff to 
provide assistance and also receive recommendations from EUCOM.  
a.  Combatant Commander (COCOM) 
The Commander of EUCOM also serves as the Supreme Allied 
Commander, Europe. His responsibility is to lead and direct his staff of senior 
military and civilians in the effort to enhance transatlantic security and defend the 
United States. These efforts include conducting military operations, international 
military partnering, and interagency partnering (EUCOM, 2012). 
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Figure 7.   System Boundaries and Interactions 
b.  Intelligence (J2) 
The focus of this directorate is intelligence. The J2 takes its 
direction from the EUCOM Commander. It provides intelligence to give warning 
of upcoming problems, to provide information that guides COCOM policy and 
decision-making (EUCOM, 2012). The J2’s mission set, or “intelligence 
enterprise strategies include” are (EUCOM, 2012): 
1. Command, control, and integrate theater intelligence activities 
2. Maximize national, allied, and partner capacity and capabilities 
through increased collaboration and federation 
3. Pursue authorities’ architectures to realize partnership potentials 
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4. Identify intelligence shortfalls and corresponding risks to develop 
mitigation strategies 
5. Train, educate, and exercise the workforce to ensure readiness 
c.  Plans and Operations (J3) 
This directorate is responsible for development and implementation 
of operations that contribute to the interests of the U.S. and its allies in the 
EUCOM AOR. The readiness of the U.S. forces at EUCOM is kept satisfactory 
through the publishing of updated “operational directives, plans, orders, joint 
training, and exercises.” The J2 serves as the channel for operations and 
requirements generation between the CJCS, North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), EUCOM and its subordinates. This directorate is divided into these eight 
subdivisions (EUCOM, 2012): 
1. Operations Division 
2. Plans Division 
3. Information Operations and Space Division 
4. Information Superiority and Knowledge Management 
5. Integrated Air and Missile Defense Division 
6. Anti-Terrorism Division 
7. Joint Training, Readiness and Exercise Division 
8. Resource Division 
d.  Policy/Strategy/Partnering (J5/8) 
This directorate develops military policy, based on political policy, 
which involves relationships with other COCOMS, international organizations, 
and subordinate commands. These policies and plans focus on supporting the 
mission of global peace and regional security. Some of the programs organized 
by this directorate include (EUCOM, 2012): 
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1. Partnership for Peace 
2. U.S. National Guard Bureau’s State Partnership Program 
3. International Military Education and Training Program  
4. Foreign Military Sales 
5. Foreign Military Financing 
6. NATO and Coalition Support 
e.  Analysis and Assessments (J7) 
This directorate’s role is to provide independent assessments of 
strategic and operational processes (EUCOM, 2012).The J7 assesses regional 
and country campaign plans, military objectives, and crisis impacts. These 
assessments are important tools to evaluate the effectiveness of past plans and 
are inputs to the formulation of new plans. The Decision Support Division 
develops analytic frameworks to relate the use of resources and conduct of 
activities to measure the progress of the COCOM’s objectives (EUCOM, 2012). 
f.  Country Teams 
Country Team is a term applied to the staff at U.S. Embassies. 
These Country Teams have no concrete organization or structure. They serve 
the U.S. Ambassador in their particular countries and are recruited according to 
the needs of the current mission in the country. The Country Teams guide the 
mission, issue policies, take guidance from State offices, and resolve competing 
interests of U.S. government agencies. Country Teams interact with COCOMs to 
assist in coordinating military efforts in countries of interest.   
g. Interagency (IA) Representatives 
IA representatives are those personnel that work for various U.S. 
governmental agencies assigned to work in EUCOM. The IA representatives 
serve as subject matter experts for their particular agency. They are relatively 
experienced individuals that understand the capabilities of their own agencies. 
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Their purpose is to provide their agencies’ perspectives to the problems 
experienced within EUCOM. They provide recommendations on actions taken to 
assist in EUCOM mission accomplishment while also supporting the shared 
mission of their individual agencies.  
3.  Develop System Objectives Hierarchy 
The objectives hierarchy is a hierarchical representation of performance, 
cost, and schedule parameters that the stakeholder(s) will use to evaluate their 
satisfaction with the system (Buede, 2009). For the purposes of this thesis, only 
the performance category was investigated. However, cost is always an 
important point of discussion and aspects of cost are presented, though in 
general terms only. A cost-benefit analysis of implementing interagency 
representatives into COCOM staffs would be beneficial to help determine which 
agency representatives should be assigned to each COCOM. Schedule might be 
an even more difficult area of study when it comes to interagency operations 
because it is an iterative process. Figure 8 depicts the high-level cost and 
performance objectives developed and organized as part of this thesis. 
Remember that the overall performance factor is to disrupt terrorist networks. 
 




Figure 9.   Objective 2.1 Aggregation 
Objective 2.1 identifies “Border Management Proficiency” as a main 
objective to disrupting transnational networks. Each subordinate objective serves 
to substantiate the usefulness of increasing proficiency of each country to 
maintain their borders. Figure 9 shows the aggregation of these subordinate 
















O2.1.1 Risks Identified Identify risks that interagency teaming may 
affect.  
O2.1.1.1 Risk Assessment Each risk shall be evaluated for its likelihood of 
occurrence. 
O2.1.1.2 Risk Tolerance The system must delineate its risk aversion 
principles and strategies. 
O2.1.2 Resources Identified Identify a minimum amount of resources 
necessary for implementation. 
O2.1.2.1 Available Personnel Identify the quantity and quality of person-
hours required and desired. 
O2.1.2.2 Available Equipment Identify the quantity and quality of machine-
hours required and desired. 
O2.1.2.3 Acquisition Process Does the acquisition process hinder the 
appropriations process? 
O2.1.3 Training Plan The training plan must derive its curricula from 
proven interagency practices that focus on 
counterterrorism. 
O2.1.3.1 Ability to Self-Train 
 
People systems must be self-sufficient for 
increased efficiency and decreased 
dependence on 3rd party organizations. 
O2.1.3.2 Training Assessment Establish a minimum threshold for 
performance during a training evolution. 
O2.1.4 Level of Security  
 
Sovereign nations must be able to secure their 
borders. 
O2.1.4.1 Level of Inter-country 
Criminal Activity  
 
Measure the level of security breach occurring 
in country. 
O2.1.4.2 Ability to Monitor Activity 
in Country  
 
Measure the ability of each nation’s policing. 
O2.1.4 Number of Interdictions 
 
Measure the number of potential criminal 
activity stopped at the borders. 
Table 3.   Objective 2.1 Description 
Objective 2.2 identifies “Information Sharing” as the next main objective to 
disrupting transnational networks. Figure 10 shows the aggregation of these 


















O2.2.1 Classification Level Operational security is meant to keep 
classified information out of the reach of 
enemies, not allies. 
O2.2.1.1 Availability of 
Information 
Identify a common information depository 
designed so that all team members are 
privy to the same information. 
O2.2.2 Timeliness Average length of time from when a report 
is written to its publishing to the common 
database.  
O2.2.2.1 Average Time to 
Generate and Publish Reports 
(Normal) 
Establish a minimum time to report during 
normal operations.  
O2.2.2.2 Average Time to 
Generate and Publish Reports 
(Emergency) 
Establish a minimum time to report during 
emergency operations.  
O2.2.2.3 Number of Reports 
Received Too Late to be 
Effective 
Limit the number of reports that go on 
unused. Identify the reason for this and 
repair that line of communication. 
O2.2.3 Corroborate Information Maintain a well-organized database that 
can be used to  
O2.2.3.1 Multiple Source 
Agreement 
Database organization allows for multiple 
agency tagging of reports.  
O2.2.3.2 Multiple Sources Differ 
 
Agencies can flag reports to be further 
explained or clarified. 
O2.2.4 Push-Pull Willingness Is the information being shared equally 
and effectively? Partners shall forward 
information to concerning partners. 
O2.2.4.1 Percentage of Time 
Spent Conversing with Partners 
Measure the amount of coordination taking 
place. 
Table 4.   Objective 2.2 Description 
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Objective 2.3 identifies “Interagency Relations” as the third main objective 
to support the disruption of transnational networks to counterterrorism. Figure 11 
shows the aggregation of these subordinate objectives. Table 5 describes each 
of the subordinate objectives. 
 




O2.3.1 Number of Different 
Representatives 
Identify the optimal number of agency 
representatives required to meet the 
mission goals. Measure the completeness 
of the whole of government approach. 
O2.3.1.1 Agencies Requesting 
Access 
Measure the number of agencies willing to 
add to the capabilities of the interagency 
team. 
O2.3.2 Sufficient Interaction Is there enough component interaction to 
support the interagency process? 
O2.3.2.1 Meeting Regularity Identify the sufficient amount of time 




Track the number of recommendations 
made by each member that is 
implemented (strategic, tactical, or 
operational). 
O2.3.3 Relevant Relations Is the partnership worthwhile? The 
teaming shall not be conducted for the 
sake of teaming. The teaming must 
support the mission. 
O2.3.3.1 Ratio of Common 
Mission to Competing Mission 
Measure the common mission and weigh it 
against any competing missions.  
Table 5.   Objective 2.3 Description 
In the context of this thesis, the objectives hierarchy is an integral part of 
the stakeholder analysis. It is used to bridge the stakeholders needs to 
requirements and functions. The objectives hierarchy is meant to break down 
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broad objectives into their progressively more specific objectives. Ultimately, the 
objectives reach a specificity that allows them to have some measurable terms.  
4.  Develop, Analyze, and Refine Requirements (Stakeholders’ 
and System) 
A stakeholder can be the owner, funds provider, user, operator, 
maintainer, or any other individual affected by the operation of the system. Each 
stakeholder has their own perspective as to how the system should operate, 
what the inputs and outputs to the system are, and which items should be 
priorities to the system. It is important to identify all system stakeholders and 




• Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
• Secretary of Defense 
• Department of State 
• EUCOM Commander 
These stakeholders provide the constraints and performance 
parameters for which the system is designed. These stakeholders provide the 
problem statement for which the system conception is derived. These 
stakeholders expect the interagency coordination process to improve results in 
the realm of threat network identification and disruption, border management in 
the EUCOM AOR, development of interagency procedures and compliance 
standards, and overall commitment of U.S. government agencies to collaborate. 
System Components: 
• JICTC Director 
• EUCOM J-Code Directors 
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• U.S. Government Agencies’ Representatives Assigned to 
EUCOM 
• Other COCOMs 
These stakeholders need to commit to the implementation of the 
system for the system to become operational. These leadership positions are 
crucial because these are the positions that must continuously convey the 
importance of interagency coordination. At times, it may seem cumbersome or 
ineffective for individuals to collaborate with their agency counterparts, and it is 
up to these leadership positions to demand that the system be utilized.  
System Victims: 
• Transnational Terrorists 
• Personnel or Equipment deemed unnecessary when capability 
overlaps are discovered 
These stakeholders will feel the negative effects of the system. 
Transnational threats will find it more and more difficult to operate. Their 
operations will have to resort to seclusion and hiding which will in turn, 
delegitimize their efforts. The ability of the system to share information and 
coordinate efforts will allow for the removal of many positions within all portions 
of the government.   
b. Stakeholders’ Requirements 
These are the requirements derived from the stakeholder analysis. 
In lieu of direct stakeholder feedback, the stakeholders’ requirements for this 
system were developed based on the literature review that was conducted. This 
literature review included testimony from many interagency coordination 
practitioners. These practitioners included the DoD, Department of State, FBI, 










Each partner shall contribute to the overall 
system capability. 
R1.2 Partner Mission Each partner will make clear their 
expectations for themselves and for each 
other partner.  
R1.3 Whole of 
Government 
Each partner shall provide training sessions 
on their specialties to contribute to the overall 
level of knowledge of the team. 
R1.4 Success Each partner shall report what they deem are 
successes of the system. 
R1.5 Failure Each partner shall report what they deem are 
failures of the system. 
R1.6 Obstacle Each partner shall report what they deem are 
obstacles to achieve success. 
Table 6.   Stakeholders’ Requirements 
c. Input Requirements/Output Requirements 
These requirements are developed within the context of the inputs, 
outputs, and controls of the system.  Buede explains that the external systems 
diagram, shown in Figure 7, is the main tool used to support the development of 














Requirement  Name Description 
R2.0  Input 
Requirements 
 
R2.1 Verification The system shall depend on multiple 
partners corroborating information. 
R2.2 Design The system shall draw from experience of 
currently functioning interagency groups and 
implement as necessary. 
R2.3 Information 
Sources 
The system shall request information from 
U.S. government agencies as well as partner 
countries. 
Table 7.   Input Requirements 
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Requirement  Name Description 





Every system component shall receive 
system evaluations to review system 




The system shall report the number of 




The system shall solicit the partner countries 
for their overall feeling of improvement or 




The system shall determine which partners 
are actively contributing to the 
counterterrorism mission. 
R3.5 Partner Request The system shall identify which capabilities 
are missing and provide recommendations 
for partner recruitment. 
R3.6 Leadership The system shall provide a rubric to assist in 
detailing interagency coordination billets. 
Table 8.   Output Requirements 
d. System-Wide Requirements 
The system wide requirements are those that do not explicitly relate 
to specific inputs or outputs. These requirements deal with the whole system.  
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R4.1 Incentives The partners will be incentivized according to 
their relative contributions to mission 
success. 
R4.2 International Law The system shall abide by international law 
and will not overstep its jurisdictions. 
R4.3 Partner 
Regulations  
The system shall abide by partner 
regulations. The system shall not request 
partners to violate their agency codes to 
accomplish COCOM missions. 
R4.4 U.S. Law The system shall not disobey U.S. law inside 
or outside of the U.S.  
R4.4 Language The system components shall limit the use of 
component-based language and will utilize 
common system language. 
Table 9.   System-Wide Requirements 
e. Technology Requirements 
The technology requirements refer to those requirements based on 
compatibility and/or interoperability issues. The complexity of an interagency 
coordination system requires that these individuals define common technology 
capabilities to foster the information sharing needed for successful operations.  
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R5.1 Data Entry The system shall use a common report 
generation form. 
R5.2 Data Storage The system shall store all reports in a 
common archive for an agreed length of time.  
R5.3 Data Search The system shall incorporate “Google” type 
search algorithm to allow for expedient 
research capability.  
R5.4 Training Module The system shall incorporate a web-based 
training component to enhance minimum 
levels of interagency coordination 
comprehension. 
Table 10.   Technology Requirements 
Buede calls the requirements the cornerstone of the systems 
engineering process because they define the design problem (Buede, 2009). The 
next step is to develop a functional architecture. The requirements guide this 
process. Each function must have at least one requirement that is satisfies. If a 
function is discovered not to satisfy any requirements then it must be reviewed to 
determine if a new requirement must be generated of if the function must be 
done away with.  
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IV.  FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
The functional architecture of a system contains a hierarchical 
model of the functions performed by the system, the system’s 
components, and the system’s configuration items. 
- Dennis M. Buede (2009, 211) 
The development of a functional hierarchy is an integral step in the design 
process. Buede defines a function as “a process that takes inputs in and 
transforms these inputs into outputs.” The system’s purpose is to produce a 
particular and specific output from a set of given inputs. 
 
Figure 12.   Top-Level Functional Decomposition 
A. FUNCTIONAL DECOMPOSITION 
Buede describes the functional decomposition as a process to breakdown 
top-level functions into their corresponding sub-functions. He explains that there 
must be a conservation of inputs and outputs. The sum of the sub-functions will 
account for each input and output specified at the top-level functions. Figure 12 
illustrates the interagency coordination top-level functions. 
The top-level function of “Conduct Interagency Coordination for 
Counterterrorism” describes the overall concept for the system. All sub-functions 
support this overarching one. The JICTC Design Concept Draft calls for a system 
that will “…contribute to synchronization, prioritization, and coordination with/for 
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non-governmental organizations, country teams, partner nations… (EUCOM, 
2010)” These six sub-functions are integral to satisfactory system performance.  
1. Identify Mission 
This function establishes the relationship between interagency 
coordination team members. The shared goal must be one that each partner 
organization believes they can contribute to. The policy of the team is to improve 
the rate of success of this mission by acting together.  
 





Function Name  Description 
F1.1 Identify Mission Common end-state(s) must be determined 
to govern the need for coordination. This 
vision is necessary for team unity.  
F1.1.1 Determine Explicit 
Shared Interest 
The leadership must agree on each of 
their respective agencies vested interests 
F1.1.2 Agree on Scope of 
Coordination 
Each agency involved must agree on the 
level of coordination (strategic, tactical, 
operational, or a combination) 
F1.1.3 Identify Agency Roles Manage expectations of each agency to 
maintain accountability 
F1.1.4 Discuss Agency 
Incentives 
Reward agencies fairly according to 
mission fulfillment  to maintain 
relationships between agencies 
Table 11.   Function F1.1 Description 
2. Share Information 
The interagency coordination effort must establish a network in which 
reports, cables, data, messages, and all other information is disseminated to 
every partner equally. Each member of the group must be included for the 
concept of coordination to succeed. Each partner should be able to either 
confirm, question, or deny any other partner’s information to make for the most 
accurate common operational/tactical/strategic picture possible. Figure 14 shows 
the sub-functions of “Share Information.” Table 12 describes the sub-functions. 
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Figure 14.   Share Information Decomposition 
Function 
Number 
Function Name Description 
F1.2 Share Information The dissemination of intelligence is of the 
utmost importance for coordination. 
F1.2.1 Establish Protocol Issue guidance from executive branch to 
require agencies to share information. 
Establish an “internal affairs” to monitor 
compliance within each agency. 
F1.2.2 Implement Shared 
System Format(s) 
Establish a shared network. Using a 
government wide SIPRNET or NMCI type 
of secured network.  
F1.2.3 Limit the use of Jargon Eliminate the use of acronyms that inhibits 
communication.  
Table 12.   Function F1.2 Description 
3.  Identify Capability Gaps and Overlaps 
The purpose of interagency coordination is to leverage all aspects of the 
government to further the likelihood of some type of mission accomplishment. 
This synchronization of partnership calls for each partner to understand what 
each other’s strengths and weaknesses are. Where one organization struggles, 
another should fill that gap. In addition, resources can be conserved or put to use 
elsewhere if capability overlaps are identified. The decomposition of this function 




Figure 15.   Identify Capability Gaps and Overlaps Decomposition 
Function 
Number 
Function Name Description 
F1.3 Identify Capability 
Gaps and Overlaps 
This function clearly pertains to the 
needed synchronization and prioritization 
of U.S. government agency resources. 
F1.3.1 Ensure Each Partner is 
Aware of Others’ 
Capabilities 
Each partner shall understand the skill 
sets provided by every other partner to 
allow for easier and quicker task 
completion. 
F1.3.2 Limit Duplicitous Work Establish a system that monitors the 
actions of each agency to identify where 
work is duplicated. Then agree on how to 
proceed to ensure that resources are not 
wasted.  
F1.3.3 Respond to Gaps The same system that is monitoring 
overlaps will also identify where resources 
are not allocated. These gaps need to be 
filled when identified. Agencies should 
recognize when they can be of help and/or 
assist in identifying which agency is 
capable of filling that gap.  
Table 13.   Function F1.3 Description 
4. Train Partners to Conduct Interagency Coordination 
A major problem in the current efforts to integrate the government’s 
capabilities is that these efforts are usually ad-hoc in nature. Agencies have long 
recognized the need to utilize the strengths of others to cover for the weaknesses 
in their own abilities, but this coordination requires practice. Training allows 
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interagency relationships to prosper by establishing performance baseline 
requirements that all partners can draw upon for guidance. The decomposition of 
this function is depicted in Figure 16. Table 14 describes these sub-functions. 
 
Figure 16.   Train Partners to Conduct Interagency Coordination Decomposition 
Function 
Number  
Function Name Description 
F1.4 Train Partners to 
Conduct Interagency 
Coordination 
Just as joint forces needed to practice 
before achieving success with joint 
operation, so is the case with interagency 
coordination. 
F1.4.1 Develop Training 
Doctrine 
A formal training curriculum developed to 
establish knowledge and capability 
thresholds for interagency coordination.  
F1.4.2 Stand Up a Career 
Path for Specialization 
in Interagency 
Teaming 
Establish a cadre of experts in interagency 
affairs.  
Table 14.   Function F1.4 Description 
5. Select Strong Leadership 
…interagency coordination at the operational level really depends 
on the persuasiveness, commitment, and the credibility of the 
leaders involved. The more engaged and flexible the leader, the 





The function of selecting strong leadership is important because the 
implementation of change to policy requires an advocate with relevance. Figure 
17 decomposes this function and Table 15 describes these sub-functions in 
detail. 
 
Figure 17.   Select Strong Leadership Decomposition 
Function 
Number 
Function Name Description 
F1.5 Select Strong 
Leadership 
Leaders of interagency groups are key to 
successful coordination. The leader must 
buy into the system and must demand the 
same of his/her subordinates.  
F1.5.1 Add Interpersonal 
Skills to Individuals 
Periodic Evaluations 
Supervisors shall comment on individuals’ 
abilities to interact with people outside of 
their own agency.  
F1.5.2 Screen Personnel 
Before Filling an IC 
Billet 
Evaluate personnel rigorously prior to 
placing them into interagency coordination 
leadership positions.  
F1.5.3 Allow for Peer and 
Subordinate Evaluation 
Allow for a dialogue up the chain of 
command that allows for interagency 
partner subordinates to provide leaders 
with feedback on the IC process. 
Table 15.   Function F1.5 Description 
6. Assess System Progress 
A system for interagency coordination must be dynamic. This system must 
continuously evaluate its efforts and adjust as necessary to respond to the 
demands of counterterrorism. The enemy is an ever-changing one and this 
interagency coordination system must leverage all of its assets in a manner that 
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allows flexibility to alter its strategies to cope with this fluid enemy. Figure 18 
illustrates this function and its sub-functions. Table16 further describes each of 
these sub-functions. 
 
Figure 18.   Assess System Progress Decomposition 
Function 
Number 
Function Name Description 
F1.6 Assess System 
Progress 
All systems require evaluation of 
performance. 
F1.6.1 Trace Outputs to 
Requirements and 
Top-Level Functions 
Ensure that outputs are lining up correctly 
with their associated functions. 
F1.6.2 Identify Lessons 
Learned 
Learn which strategies and techniques 
work and which ones do not. 
F1.6.3 Initiate Change to 
Policy 
Allow for adjustment without difficult 
bureaucratic hurdles. Use lessons learned 
to determine how policy should change.  
Table 16.   Function F1.6 Description 
B. TRACING REQUIREMENTS TO ELEMENTS OF FUNCTIONAL 
ARCHITECTURE 
 Buede states that is important to trace requirements to functions to check 
consistency (Buede, 2009, pg 246). This technique is a method to ensure that 
the correct input/output requirements are contained in each specification created 
during the design of the system. Tracing of requirements to functions also aids in 
checking the individuality of each function. If two functions contain the same 
requirements, that is a sign that they may be the same function. It also allows for  
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the identification of missing requirements or functions. Table 17 identifies which 




Function Name Requirement(s) 
F1.1 Identify Mission R1.1, R1.2, R2.1, R4.2, R4.3, R4.4 
F1.1.1 Determine Explicit 
Shared Interest 
R1.1, R1.2, R2.1, R3.4 
F1.1.2 Agree on Scope of 
Coordination 
R1.1, R1.2 
F1.1.3 Identify Agency Roles R1.2, R3.4, R4.2, R4.3, R4.4 
F1.1.4 Discuss Agency 
Incentives 
R3.4, R4.1 
F1.2 Share Information R1.1, R2.1, R2.3, R4.4, R5.1, R5.2, R5.3 
F1.2.1 Establish Protocol R1.3, R2.1, R2.3, R5.1, R5.2, R5.3 
F1.2.2 Implement Shared 
System Format(s) 
R2.1, R2.3, R5.1, R5.2, R5.3 
F1.2.3 Limit the use of Jargon R2.1, R4.4 
F1.3 Identify Capability 
Gaps and Overlaps 
R1.1, R2.1, R2.2, R3.4, R3.5, R5.1, R5.2, 
R5.3 
F1.3.1 Ensure Each Partner is 
Aware of Others’ 
Capabilities 
R1.2, R1.3, R1.4, R1.5, R1.6, R2.1, R2.2, 
R3.5 
F1.3.2 Limit Duplicitous Work R1.3, R2.2, R3.4 
F1.3.3 Respond to Gaps R1.4, R1.5, R1.6, R2.2, R3.4, R3.5 
F1.4 Train Partners to 
Conduct IC 
R1.3, R3.2, R3.3, R5.4 
F1.4.1 Develop Training 
Doctrine 
R1.3, R3.1, R3.2, R3.3, R4.2, R4.3, R4.4, 
R5.1, R5.2, R5.3,  R5.4 
F1.4.2 Stand Up a Career 






Function Name Requirement(s) 
Interagency Teaming 
F1.5 Select Strong 
Leadership 
R1.1, R3.5, R3.6 
F1.5.1 Add Interpersonal 
Skills to the Individuals 
Periodic Evaluations 
and Promotion Boards 
R3.6 
F1.5.2 Screen Personnel for 
their Willingness to do 
IC Before Filling a 
Billet 
R3.6 
F1.5.3 Allow for Peer and 
Subordinate Evaluation 
R3.4 
F1.6 Assess System 
Progress 
R1.3, R1.4, R1.5, R1.6, R3.4, R3.5, R5.1, 
R5.2, R5.3 
F1.6.1 Trace Outputs to 
Requirements and 
Top-Level Functions 
R3.1, R3.4, R4.2, R4.3, R4.4 
F1.6.2 Identify Lessons 
Learned 
R1.1, R1.4, R1.5, R1.6, R2.2, R3.1, R3.2, 
R3.3, R3.4, R5.1, R5.2, R5.3 
F1.6.3 Initiate Change to 
Policy 
R2.2, R3.1, R3.4, R3.5 
Table 17.   Function to Requirement Mapping 
Systems engineering relies on the correct identification of the functions that 
a system must perform to accomplish an overarching mission. This functional 
analysis of a system is important to the physical analysis. The functional 
architecture developed in this thesis is a top-down structuring; it has six top-level 
functions that are supported by its multiple subordinate functions. The functional 
architecture links the functions to requirements. 
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V.  PHYSICAL ANALYSIS 
A. PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE 
Buede states that the physical architecture of a system is a description of 
the resources that make up that system (Buede, 2009). The tracing of physical 
components to functions and requirements ensures that a system is complete. 
Again, this iterative process can go through many instantiations before a system 
is complete. A complete physical architecture was not completed for this thesis. 
The following is a general discussion of the physical architecture. 
The generic physical architecture is a general description of system 
components. The instantiated physical architecture is concerned with the specific 
performance characteristics of each component with regard to the requirements 
each component addresses. This thesis is only concerned with the general 
physical architecture.  
Recall that the top-level functions for the system are: 
• Identify Mission 
• Share Information 
• Identify Capability Gaps and Overlaps 
• Train Partners to Conduct Interagency Coordination 
• Select Strong Leadership 
• Assess System Progress 
1. Proposed General Architecture 
The command structure of EUCOM was explained in Chapter two of this 
thesis, and depicted in Figure 6. It is not the intent of this thesis to recommend 
command structure changes at any level of the DoD or U.S. government. The 




interagency coordination. Instead of changing the command structure of the 
COCOM, the JICTC and J9 were established to coordinate and enhance the 
interagency process.  
The overarching function analyzed in this thesis is to leverage the abilities 
of multiple U.S government agencies and international partners in a way that 
makes the sum of the whole better than any of the individuals to aid in the 
performance of counterterrorism operations. The J9 and the JICTC share many 
functions. Instead of employing two separate entities charged with taking the lead 
in interagency coordination, this thesis recommends this effort should be shifted 
to a sub-committee within EUCOM. The goal of interagency coordination is to 
enhance the accomplishment of a mission shared between two or more 
agencies. The J9 and JICTC are not immersed in the EUCOM mission. They are 
more of a 3rd party entity attempting to supervise coordination.  
The alternative would be to create an interagency committee within 
EUCOM. This committee would pull key individuals that are filling billets already 
in the EUCOM command structure. These EUCOM staffers would be chosen 
based on their ability to interact with other agency representatives. Each 
interagency representative recruited by EUCOM would be placed in the most 
appropriate directorate according to their skillset. These interagency 
representatives would also be members of the interagency coordination 
committee. Figure 19 illustrates how this EUCOM committee might look. The 
committee calls for participation of the partners to come from personnel that are 
capable of initiating action within EUCOM.  
Once the committee is established, it will be further decomposed into sub-
committees. These sub-committees will be structured so that they line up with 
each function in the functional architecture. Figure 20 illustrates the six proposed 
sub-committees established for the accountability of system function satisfaction. 
The COCOM Commander retains overall responsibility of the actions of the 
Interagency Coordination Committee. The sub-committee organization promotes 
the ability of the Interagency Coordination Committee to accommodate for 
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multiple missions and multiples roles. A mission tasked to the committee is 
attacked as a whole. Again, this fluid structure requires that the sub-committees 
are able to determine the shared mission, decide which agency/person will 
assume leadership, pass information adequately, assign partners tasks to assist 
in mission accomplishment, demand that partners assess themselves and one 
another, and commit to implementing form learned during training to practice in 
the field.   
 




























VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis utilized systems engineering principles and methods, most 
notably the processes detailed in Dennis Buede’s The Engineering Design of 
Systems, to analyze the interagency coordination efforts that are required to 
make a more synchronous and efficient whole of government effort to combat 
terrorism in the EUCOM AOR. This thesis conducted an expansive literary review 
that assessed the need for an interagency coordination system. This literature 
review was combined with information gathered during a research trip to EUCOM 
headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. This research trip brought to light the 
organizational troubles that hinder interagency cooperation. From this, a 
functional decomposition of the top-level function was derived. This functional 
decomposition was verified by tracing each function to associated requirements 
and objectives. An external systems diagram was constructed to assist in the 
formulation of those objectives and requirements. 
A preliminary physical architecture was proposed based on the functional 
architecture created. The physical architecture recommended called interagency 
participation to be “in-house.” This recommendation was made to limit third party 
involvement. The interagency coordination functions are best accomplished 
when the members involved have a stake in the mission. The physical 
architecture calls for sub-committees being formed, from existing EUCOM 
directorates, that match the second-level functions created in the functional 
architecture. These sub-committees would ensure that each of the functions 
necessary for synchronous performance of interagency coordination are met by 
utilizing personnel that already have a stake in the success of EUCOM AOR 
operations. The most important aspect of these sub-committees is the elimination 
of the need to employ multiple interagency organizations, such as J9 and JICTC 
within the same COCOM. This eliminates overlapping jurisdictions, billets, and 
funding. 
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The research questions addressed in this thesis were: 
1. What are the fundamental attributes required for productive 
interagency coordination allowing for the successful conduct of counter 
trafficking and counterterrorism in the EUCOM area of responsibility 
(AOR)? 
2. How can a stakeholder analysis, objectives hierarchy, requirements 
definition, and functional decomposition assist EUCOM in its effort to 
disrupt transnational terrorist networks? 
The systems engineering process revealed that these fundamental 
attributes are dependent on the functionality of the system. The functions that 
must be performed during the conduct of interagency coordination for successful 
counter trafficking and counterterrorism in the EUCOM AOR are: 
• Identify Mission 
• Share Information 
• Identify Capability Gaps and Overlaps 
• Train Partners to Conduct Interagency Coordination 
• Select Strong Leadership 
• Assess System Progress 
This thesis created a functional architecture based on an objectives 
hierarchy and requirements generation. A literature review of national policy on 
interagency coordination and past interagency efforts and studies was conducted 
to serve as part of the stakeholder analysis. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis provides only a cursory look at top-level functions for 
interagency coordination to combat terrorism. Research should be conducted to 
determine more specific functions and requirements. The next step in the 
systems engineering design process would be to conduct a complete physical 
analysis. The physical architecture is necessary to ensure that each functional  
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component is allocated to a physical one. Then an analysis of alternatives should 
be conducted to determine the best organizations to include accomplishing 
specific mission sets.  
Other opportunities for further research include analysis of interfaces 
between U.S. government entities and foreign government entities, cost-benefit 
analysis of U.S. government presence in certain countries, case-study 
preparation of foreign interagency processes, terror network analysis to 
determine weaknesses that U.S. government entities can exploit, studies on 
alternative organizational paradigms within the U.S. government, and many 
others. It must be said that, with a system as complex as interagency 
coordination, systems engineering and systems thinking is already being 
conducted. The principles of systems engineering are common ones. The 
principles may not always be explicitly carried out, and that is why a systems 
engineer can have an impact by analyzing the system objectively.  
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